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Butler: Shareholder Nomination Restrictions

NOTE
Shareholder Nomination Restrictions: A
Corporate Governance Mystery
St. Denis J. Villere & Co. v. Epiq Systems, Inc., No. 1516-CV26509 (Mo. Cir. Ct.
Jackson Cty. Apr. 5, 2016)

Aristotle A. Butler*

I. INTRODUCTION
Envision a citizen registered to vote in his or her state’s gubernatorial
election. Further suppose that in the months leading up to the general election, that citizen is denied the right to vote in any of the primaries for that
governorship. Effectively, the citizen is permitted to vote for whomever he
or she chooses in the general election but lacks the power to help select who
ultimately participates in that race. Now, hypothesize the reason that person
is prevented from voting in the primary is to ensure that those promulgating
the rule can hand-select the candidates.
When electoral rights such as these “are subjected to ‘severe’ restrictions,” the United States Supreme Court has held that “the regulation
must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.’”1 It has further held that “[c]asting a ballot in a primary election
established and regulated by state law is an act of voting . . . and the immunity against discrimination on account of race or color which is guaranteed by
[the Constitution] protects the plaintiff in his right to vote in such primary,
where the only obstacle interposed is that he is a negro.”2
So, what does this have to do with corporate governance? In Nixon v.
Herndon, the discriminatory nomination restrictions were held unconstitutional because they created a suspect classification that prevented African
Americans from having any real choice in selecting their elected officials.3
Corporate governance in a publicly held corporation is analogous. To effec*

B.A., Westminster College, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of
Law, 2018; Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018. Thank
you to Professor Thom Lambert for his assistance throughout the writing process; to
the editors of the Missouri Law Review for their helpful comments and feedback during the editing process; and to my family and friends for their unwavering support.
1. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992) (quoting Norman v. Reed,
502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)) (applying strict scrutiny, the Court’s most stringent standard of review reserved specifically for rights deemed fundamental to the exercise of
liberty).
2. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 536–37 (1927).
3. See id. at 541.
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tively participate in the maximization of their investment, shareholders in a
company have the right to vote and to nominate candidates for director. Absent the right to nominate, the right to vote in the ultimate election becomes
severely watered down. Despite corporate governance existing for decades,
the area of nomination restrictions has gone largely without judicial analysis.
This Note first introduces the facts and judgment of a recent case in the
Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri: St. Denis J. Villere & Co. v. Epiq
Systems, Inc.4 It then examines the origins of shareholders’ right to nominate
candidates for director, the purpose of that right, and the background for analyzing restrictions of that right. It next discusses the judgment of the court.
To be clear, the holding of the actual case is largely insignificant for the purposes of this Note. Its facts, however, do present an important example of
shareholder nomination restriction issues, which are the focus of this Note.
Finally, this Note concludes by evaluating the nomination restrictions in the
case, as well as other possible restrictions; addressing what should be the
source of shareholders’ right to nominate; and proposing the appropriate legal
framework within which such restrictions should be reviewed.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
St. Denis J. Villere & Company, L.L.C. (“Villere”), a Louisiana investment management firm, and George Young, Chief Compliance Officer for
Villere, were the plaintiffs in this shareholder nomination action.5 Epiq Systems, Inc. (“Epiq”), a Missouri publicly held legal services and technology
provider,6 and its board of directors (“Board”) were the defendants.7 Villere
owned 5,255,524 shares of Epiq common stock.8 These shares, like most

4. St. Denis J. Villere & Co. v. Epiq Systems, Inc., No. 1516-CV26509 (Mo.
Cir. Ct. Jackson Cty. Apr. 5, 2016).
5. Petition at 5–6, St. Denis J. Villere & Co. v. Epiq Systems, Inc., (Mo. Cir.
Ct. Jackson Cty. Dec. 11, 2015) (No. 1516-CV26509).
6. The company’s emphasis is in providing electronic software to “law firms,
corporations, financial institutions and government agencies – helping them streamline the administration of business operations, class action and mass tort, court reporting, eDiscovery, regulatory[] compliance, restructuring, and bankruptcy matters.”
The Epiq Difference: About Epiq, EPIQ, http://www.epiqsystems.com/the-epiqdifference/about-epiq (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
7. Petition, supra note 5, at 6. The Board is composed of the following members: Tom W. Olofson, CEO; Brad D. Scott, President and Chief Operating Officer;
W. Bryan Satterlee, Lead Independent Director; Edward M. Connolly, Jr., Director;
Charles C. Connely, IV, Director; James A. Byrnes, Director; Joel Pelofsky, Director;
and Douglas M. Gaston, Director (collectively, “Defendant Directors”). Id. at 1–2, 6–
7.
8. Id. at 20. Common stock is “[a] class of stock entitling the holder to vote on
corporate matters, to receive dividends after other claims and dividends have been
paid (esp. to preferred shareholders), and to share in assets upon liquidation.” Stock,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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publicly traded stock, were held in “street name.”9 This means the shares on
Epiq’s stock ledger are registered under the name Cede & Company (“Cede
& Co.”), which serves as Villere’s nominee, or stock steward.10 Young is
also an Epiq shareholder and was nominated to serve as a member of Epiq’s
Board.11
Epiq has been a publicly traded company since February of 1997.12 The
company is traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange and currently has
37,513,009 outstanding shares of common stock.13 Epiq consistently fell
short of its declared financial goals over the ten years prior to the suit.14 In
particular, Epiq failed to meet its revenue guidance in five of the last seven
years and missed its earnings per share guidance in all seven of those years.15
Moreover, Epiq stock has largely underachieved for the greater part of a decade.16 During that time, the disparity between Epiq’s underperformance and
the general performance of the market grew increasingly farther apart.17
9. Petition, supra note 5, at 21.
[R]ecord holders are frequently depository companies (Depository Trust
Company, for example, holding through its nominee, Cede & Co.). They hold
for brokers or other institutions, who in turn hold for beneficial owners. The
institutions sometimes contract with Independent Election Company of America (IECA) which distributes voting materials for brokers to their customers
and which, as agent, receives back proxy cards or consent cards from beneficial owners, collects them and makes out one or more cards for each broker or
bank for which it acts. IECA then physically sends voting cards to the corporation or the judges of election. The depository companies (the actual record
holders) will have given blanket proxies to their customers – the institutional
record holders, who will then act themselves or through IECA.

Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 664 (Del. Ch. 1988).
10. Petition, supra note 5, at 21.
A nominee is a person or firm into whose name securities or other properties are transferred to facilitate transactions, while leaving the customer as
the actual owner. A nominee account is a type of account in which
a stockbroker holds shares belonging to clients, making buying and selling
those shares easier.

Nominee, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nominee.asp (last
visited Feb. 3, 2018); see also Nominee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(“A party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or who receives and distributes funds for the benefit of others.”).
11. Petition, supra note 5, at 6.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 9.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. This gap is reflected within the total shareholder returns for the previous
annualized periods of ten, five, three, and one years. Id.; see infra Table I.
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As Epiq continued to struggle economically, Villere and its other investors vocalized their discontent with the Board’s actions.18 In June of 2010,
the Board amended Epiq’s Bylaws to include an advance notice provision
(the “Notification Bylaw”),19 which modified the eligibility requirements for
shareholder director nominations,20 the informational disclosures required of
both nominees and nominating shareholders,21 and the deadline for submitting the information to the company.22
On October 9, 2015, the Board again amended Epiq’s Bylaws (the
“2014 Amendment”).23 The most significant addition of the 2014 Amendment was the eligibility requirement that nominating shareholders must “have
been in compliance with their obligations (including with respect to timing,
filing and disclosure) under 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l through 240.13d-7 under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘Exchange Act’) for a period of at least
twelve months prior to such time as a notice is delivered.”24
Villere, remaining unsatisfied with Epiq’s progress, prepared a slate of
nominees to stand for election to the company’s Board (the “Nomination”).25
Since its shares amounted to at least a seven percent beneficial ownership in
Epiq over the previous two years, Villere instructed Cede & Co. to make the
Nomination official prior to the notification deadline.26 Villere maintained it
complied with all other requirements of the Notification Bylaw.27 Despite

18. Petition, supra note 5, at 10.
19. Id.
20. “[E]xcept as otherwise required by applicable law, nominations of persons

for election to the Board of Directors shall only be given by shareholders who own at
least five percent (5%) of the Corporation’s outstanding common stock and (x) who
have held such shares for at least twenty-four months . . . .” Amended and Restated
Bylaws
of
Epiq
Sys.,
Inc.,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1027207/000119312514366924/d802037de
x31.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2018) [hereinafter Amended and Restated Bylaws] (emphasis added) (art. II, § 2.3(a)(iii)) (amended Oct. 8, 2014).
21. Id. (art. II, § 2.3(c)) (providing a comprehensive list of disclosures required
by all parties); see also infra Appendix A (providing the full text of § 2.3(c)).
22. “To be timely, a shareholder’s notice shall be delivered to the Secretary at
the principal executive offices of the Corporation not less than one hundred eighty
(180) calendar days . . . prior to the first anniversary of the date the proxy statement
was released to the shareholders in connection with the preceding year’s annual meeting . . . .” Amended and Restated Bylaws, supra note 20 (emphasis added) (art. II, §
2.3(b)).
23. Petition, supra note 5, at 14.
24. Amended and Restated Bylaws, supra note 20 (art. II, § 2.3(a)).
25. Petition, supra note 5, at 20.
26. Id. at 20–21.
27. Id. at 21. Villere asserted that Cede & Co. is a record holder of greater than
five percent of Epiq stock, that it has been for more than two years, and that both
Cede & Co. and Villere meet the requirements of the Exchange Act. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss4/8

4

Butler: Shareholder Nomination Restrictions

2017]

SHAREHOLDER NOMINATION RESTRICTIONS

1145

Villere’s compliance and the candidates being adequately qualified, the Board
rejected the Nomination.28
In December of 2015, Villere filed a complaint with the Jackson County
Circuit Court alleging that Epiq’s Bylaws directly infringed upon valid shareholder rights.29 Particularly, Villere asserted that the following illicitly constrained shareholder nomination and voting rights: “(a) the Defendant Directors’ adoption and application of the invalid [Notification Bylaw] and 2014
Amendment[] to the Notification Bylaw; (b) Defendants’ refusal to honor
Villere’s valid termination of the Director Appointment Agreement; and (c)
Defendants’ invalid rejection of the Nomination.”30
Villere further contended that the Board’s refusal to accept the Nomination was improper where: (1) the Agreement was validly terminated; (2) the
Nomination complied with all requirements in Epiq’s Bylaws; (3) the Notification Bylaw and 2014 Amendment served as “a pretext to reject an otherwise valid Nomination” and were thus invalid; and (4) the amendments were
“facially invalid” because their sole purpose was to entrench the incumbent
Board by dampening shareholders’ ability to act effectively.31 Villere posited
that the Board’s enforcement of the Notification Bylaw further limited the
already minimal group of shareholders eligible to make nominations.32
Villere requested the court issue a declaratory judgment holding the
Agreement was validly terminated, the Nomination complied with all of
Epiq’s Bylaws, and the bylaw amendments violated Missouri law.33 The
complaint likewise requested Epiq be enjoined from meddling with Villere’s
nomination to the Board.34 Epiq’s Answer and Counterclaim sought to enjoin
both Villere and Cede & Co. “from continuing to violate the Director Appointment Agreement and . . . Bylaws by attempting to nominate directors for
the 2016 Annual Meeting of Shareholders.”35 The Board asserted that Villere
did not qualify as an “owner” of at least five percent under the Bylaws be28. Id. at 21–22. This was Villere’s second attempt at nominating candidates to
Epiq’s Board. Id. at 4. Its first attempt resulted in a Director Appointment Agreement (the “Agreement”) in which Epiq assented to expand the size of the board from
seven to nine members, create a committee that would be responsible for reviewing
its “business strateg[ies] and alternatives,” and allow Villere to appoint its own member of the Board. Id. at 18. In exchange, Villere consented to a standstill period
wherein it would refrain from seeking proxies and other shareholders’ consent without first terminating the Agreement. Id. However, notice of Villere’s termination had
to precede Epiq’s inclusion of Mr. Robert on its own slate for election at the next
annual meeting. Id.; see infra Appendix B (Director Appointment Agreement).
29. Petition, supra note 5, at 1, 23, 28.
30. Id. at 23.
31. Id. at 25.
32. See id. at 27.
33. Judgment at 2, St. Denis J. Villere & Co. v. Epiq Systems, Inc., (Mo. Cir. Ct.
Jackson Cty. Apr. 5, 2016) (No. 1516-CV26509).
34. Id.
35. Id.
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cause it was not a shareholder of record.36 They further contended that Cede
& Co. did not qualify as an owner because it was a conglomeration of shareholders and not a single shareholder as the term intended.37 Epiq additionally
asked the court to issue a declaratory judgment stating that Villere’s nomination was unlawful.38
Subsequently, the parties agreed to permit the court to rule on all preliminary issues deemed purely legal in nature.39 After two days, the court issued
its Judgment.40 The Jackson County Circuit Court began its analysis by examining the construction and termination of the Agreement under the general
principles of contract law.41 In reaching its conclusion, the court cited the
“plain, unambiguous language” of Section 2(c) of the Agreement.42 The
court then proceeded to analyze Villere’s nomination, which the court held
was compliant with all of Epiq’s Bylaws.43 In particular, the court pronounced that “Cede, through Villere,” is a beneficial owner and registered
shareholder of Epiq and, as such, is qualified to nominate a slate of directors.44 Accordingly, the court ruled that precluding Villere from presenting
its slate of nominees at the 2016 Annual Meeting, when it had properly complied with all nomination requirements, would cause it to suffer irreparable
harm.45 Unfortunately, the court did not have occasion to address the validity
of the shareholder nomination restrictions, which is the focus of this Note.46

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. The parties agreed that consenting to have the court determine many of
the preliminary legal issues would eliminate the need to present “some, if not all,
evidence.” Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2–3.
42. Id. at 6.
43. Id. at 6–8.
44. Id. at 8.
45. Id.
46. Epiq and Villere entered a settlement agreement on June 6, 2016, wherein
Villere agreed to terminate the remainder of the litigation. The agreement provides
that three of the Villere nominees will be appointed to the Board, expanding its size to
twelve members; three incumbent directors will withdraw from the board prior to
January 1, 2017, reducing the Board’s composition back to nine members; Epiq will
amend its Bylaws to remove the changes of the 2010 Amendment and the timing of
the Annual Meeting; and Villere will be subject to a Standstill Period as long as any
of its appointees is a member of the Board. Epiq Sys., Inc., Current Report (Form 8K) (June 7, 2016).
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A corporation is a type of business organization47 “established in accordance with legal rules into a legal . . . person that has[:] a legal personality
distinct from the natural persons who make it up[;] exists indefinitely apart
from them[;] and has the legal powers that its constitution gives it.”48 The
United States Supreme Court has described corporations as “artificial being[s], invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law . . . .
[with] only those properties which the charter of [their] creation confers . . .
either expressly, or as incidental to [their] very existence.”49
In Missouri, a publicly held corporation is one having “a class of voting
stock registered with the [S]ecurities and [E]xchange [C]ommission under
Section 12 of the Exchange Act and . . . incorporated under the laws of the
state of Missouri.”50 The natural persons who make up a publicly held corporation are its board of directors, officers, employees, and stockholders (or
“shareholders” as they are colloquially known).51 Publicly held corporations
are unique in that ownership and control are separated.52 The corporation’s
owners are its shareholders; however, the board of directors is responsible for
managing its resources and governing operations.53 This division creates an
environment susceptible to agency costs.54 Fundamentally, managers have an
incentive to position other people’s money to their own benefit, but the
shareholders want them to do whatever will generate the greatest return on

47. Business organizations can accurately be described as a group of people,
related to each other via contract, working together in the pursuit of profit, where
resources are allocated by fiat. Thomas A. Lambert, Wall Chair in Corp. Law and
Governance and Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law, Lecture in Publicly
Held Corporations (Aug. 23, 2016).
48. Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).
49. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
50. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.015(10) (2016). A point of clarification: Missouri
statute is used as a reference in this Note due to the subject case’s origin. In fact, it is
common knowledge that the great majority of corporations are incorporated in the
state of Delaware. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1
(2007), http://corp.delaware.gov/pdfs/whycorporations_english.pdf.
51. Lambert, supra note 47.
52. Id.
53. Id. “A board of directors shall consist of one or more individuals with the
number specified or fixed in accordance with the articles of incorporation or bylaws.”
MO. REV. STAT. § 351.315(1) (2016).
54. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Professor Thomas A. Lambert at 13, St. Denis
J. Villere & Co. v. Epiq Systems, Inc., (Mo. Cir. Ct. Jackson Cty. Mar. 7, 2016) (No.
1516-CV26509) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert] (“[L]osses . . .
occur when an agent (director) fails to put the resources of the principal (the shareholders) to their highest and best use.”).
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their investment.55 Whenever a corporation’s resources are not put to their
best ends, an agency cost – social waste – occurs.56
To prevent social waste, directors are subjected to certain fiduciary duties – namely, a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. 57 The duty of care requires directors to act in a manner they reasonably believe to be in the best
interests of the corporation.58 Similarly, “[t]he duty of loyalty requires that
the best interests of a corporation and its shareholders take precedence over
any self-interest of a director, officer, or controlling shareholder that is not
shared by the stockholders generally.”59 Managers are also constrained by
the potential for corporate takeovers and the nomination process for directors.60
With this basic structure in mind, Part A briefly discusses the framework under which courts evaluate corporate documents and the intent of their
drafters. Part B then examines the nature of shareholder nominations, and
Part C evaluates directors’ ability to control that process.

A. Interpreting Corporate Documents
It is commonplace in Missouri for corporate documents, including any
agreements, articles of incorporation, and bylaws, to “be construed according
to [the] general rules governing contracts.”61 The construction of contracts is
a question of law to be determined by the courts.62
Where parties to a dispute disagree as to the effect of a provision in a
corporate document, “[t]he cardinal principle of contract interpretation is to
ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect to that intent.”63 The
contract’s terms are “read as a whole to determine the intention of the parties
55. See id. (In the corporate context, “managers may squander assets of their
shareholder principals by acting negligently or with self-interest.”). Corporate waste
is “an exchange that is so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.” In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 759 (Del. Ch. 2005). “In other
words, waste is [an] . . . unconscionable case[] where directors irrationally squander
or give away corporate assets.” Id. at 749 (second alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000)).
56. See Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at 13.
57. Id.
58. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 751.
59. HCI Inv’rs, LLC v. Fox, 412 S.W.3d 424, 431 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting
Becker v. Knoll, 239 P.3d 830, 834 (Kan. 2010)).
60. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at 13.
61. DCW Enters., Inc. v. Terre du Lac Ass’n, Inc., 953 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1997).
62. Schneidler v. Feeder’s Grain & Supply, Inc., 24 S.W.3d 739, 742 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000).
63. Dunn Indus. Grp., Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 112 S.W.3d 421, 428 (Mo.
2003) (en banc) (per curiam).
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and are given their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning.”64 Further, the court
interprets the terms of the document in such a way as to “avoid rendering
other terms meaningless.”65 This is because “[a] construction that attributes a
reasonable meaning to all the provisions of the agreement is preferred to one
that leaves some of the provisions without function or sense.”66
A contract is not to be found ambiguous “merely because the parties
disagree as to its construction.”67 Rather, the language of a contract “is ambiguous when there is uncertainty as to its meaning and it is fairly susceptible
to more than one meaning so that reasonable persons may fairly and honestly
differ on construction of its terms.”68 Ambiguity also exists where the terms
are marred by “duplicity” or “indistinctness.”69 In the case of an unambiguous contract, “the intent of the parties is determined from the contract
alone.”70 Moreover, a court does not opt for its own construal of the parties’
intent where it is “expressed in [the] clear, unambiguous language” of the
contract.71 A court may not fabricate an ambiguity or draw upon extrinsic
evidence “to vary or contradict the terms of an unambiguous agreement.”72

B. Shareholder Nominations
Within the corporate governance of a publicly held company, it is the
responsibility and the right of shareholders to elect the company’s directors.73
Shareholders have been held to be “the ideological underpinning upon which
the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”74 Allowing shareholders to elect a
corporation’s directors is essential “as [a] . . . disciplinary tool to limit agency

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
DCW Enters., Inc. v. Terre du Lac Ass’n, Inc., 953 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1997).
69. Taylor v. Bar Plan Mut. Ins. Co., 457 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
70. Schneidler v. Feeder’s Grain & Supply, Inc., 24 S.W.3d 739, 742 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000).
71. Dunn Indus. Grp., 112 S.W.3d at 429.
72. Id.
73. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.315(2) (2016) (“The articles of incorporation may
confer upon holders of any class or series of stock the right to elect one or more directors who shall serve for such term and shall have such voting powers as shall be stated
in the articles of incorporation.”). Moreover, Congress has explicitly recognized a
right to vote in federally regulated industries such as national banks. 12 U.S.C. § 61
(2012) (“In all elections of directors, each shareholder shall have the right to vote the
number of shares owned by him for as many persons as there are directors to be elected . . . .”).
74. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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costs and to facilitate beneficial changes in corporate control.”75 In order to
exercise control over a corporation through its board, shareholders must be
able to either elect new directors or vote to remove incumbent directors.76 It
has become an “[i]nternationally accepted corporate governance principle[]”
that the right to elect directors rests with shareholders77 and that
“[s]hareholder voting rights are sacrosanct.”78
The right to nominate, while related, is “conceptually and chronologically distinct from the right to vote on the election of such candidates.”79 A
nomination, as it pertains to corporate democracy, “involves formally placing
the name of a candidate for office before the electorate at a meeting of the
electorate to elect members of the governing body.”80 The intent of the nomination is to draw the attention of the voters to the nominee’s candidacy and
to “facilitate[] the election of the nominee over any candidate not nominated
but who might otherwise be eligible for election through a write-in or equivalent mechanism.”81
What then is the legal source of shareholders’ right to nominate? Unlike
the right to vote, the right of shareholders to nominate candidates for director
is largely nonexistent in corporate statutes.82 Absent the express grant of a
right to nominate in a corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws, the
source of shareholders’ right to nominate is largely amorphous.83 It is common practice for articles or bylaws to place limitations on shareholders’ ability to nominate; however, “a provision affirmatively conferring that right . . .
75. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Director Nominations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 117,
118 (2014).
76. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at 14. Epiq, with the
inclusion of its shareholder nomination restrictions, has made a removal vote practically impossible. Id. Missouri corporate law provides that a removal vote has to
happen at a meeting specifically designated for such voting. MO. REV. STAT. §
351.315(3) (2016). Epiq’s Bylaws preclude shareholders themselves from being able
to convene “special meetings,” and “provide for no alternative procedure [to] . . .
pursue director removal.” Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at
14. It stands to reason that no authorized member of the Board would call such a
meeting voluntarily. Consequently, shareholders only hope to use their voting rights
to exercise control in the electoral process.
77. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 119.
78. Icahn Partners LP v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., No. 7404-VCN, 2012 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 85, at *11 (Del Ch. Apr. 20, 2012).
79. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 126.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 127.
82. The lone exception being the state of Maryland. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
ASS’NS § 2-504(f) (West 2017) (stating “[t]he charter or bylaws may require any
stockholder proposing a nominee for election as a director or any other matter for
consideration at a meeting of the stockholders to provide advance notice of the nomination or proposal to the corporation before a date or within a period of time specified
in the charter or bylaws” (emphasis added)).
83. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 131.
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is surely rare at best.”84 In what little discussion of the source of the right to
nominate candidates for director exists, two leading theories emerge: (1) it is
intrinsically tied to the right to vote, and (2) it is within the shareholders’
right to participate in matters of proper business.85

1. The Right to Nominate Is Included in the Right to Vote
Missouri is one of few jurisdictions that recognizes the right to nominate
director candidates as being equally important as voting rights.86 In a 1995
decision, it was determined that “the rights to nominate director candidates
and propose business are integral components of a shareholder’s right to
vote.”87 The court drew its reasoning from an earlier Third Circuit opinion,
Durkin v. National Bank of Olyphant. In Durkin, the court stated:
We rest our holding as well on the common sense notion that the
unadorned right to cast a ballot in a contest for office, a vehicle for
participatory decisionmaking and the exercise of choice, is meaningless without the right to participate in selecting the contestants. As the
nominating process circumscribes the range of the choice to be made,
it is a fundamental and outcome-determinative step in the election of
officeholders. To allow for voting while maintaining a closed candidate selection process thus renders the former an empty exercise. This
is as true in the corporate suffrage context as it is in civic elections,
where federal law recognizes that access to the candidate selection
process is a component of constitutionally-mandated voting rights . . .
. And there is no more justification for precluding shareholders from
nominating candidates for their board of directors than there would be

84. Id. at 127. “Perhaps rarer or even non-existent is a charter or bylaw provision conferring upon the board of directors the right to nominate candidates for election to that body.” Id. at 127–28.
85. See id. at 128, 131–32; see also Levitt Corp. v. Office Depot, Inc., C.A. No.
3622-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 47 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2008) (exemplifying that
nominations are matters of proper business). A third theory espouses that the right to
nominate is present in the more general right to participate in the electoral process.
See Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 131; Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co.,
802 A.2d 294, 310–11 (Del. Ch. 2002). Nonetheless, the notion that such an integral
right exists merely in the penumbra of such a vague entitlement is not considered in
this Note. See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 263 (1974).
86. See AHI Metnall, L.P. v. J.C. Nichols Co., 891 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 (W.D.
Mo. 1995) (stating “[p]laintiff claims that Section 351.245(1) gives Missouri corporate shareholders an implicit right to nominate directors” and adopting that interpretation).
87. Id. at 1358.
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for public officials to deny citizens the right to vote because of their
race, poverty or sex.88

More recently, decisions in other jurisdictions have advanced the notion
that the right to vote contains the right to nominate, as well.89 In 2002, the
Court of Chancery in Delaware asserted the “right of shareholders to participate in the voting process includes the right to nominate an opposing slate.”90
That court also cited Durkin, reaffirming the view that the right to vote is
meaningless without a coinciding right to nominate.91 Limitations of this
view are addressed in Part V below.

2. Right to Nominate as a Matter of Proper Business
Alternatively, the source of the right to nominate may be its necessity as
a proper procedural requirement for conducting a meeting.92 “[A]t a meeting
at which an election is to occur, a motion to place a candidate before the body
for election can readily be considered to be business properly conducted . . . .
“93 Under this supposition, the right to nominate draws upon statutory prescriptions indicating that “all proper business may be transacted” at an annual
shareholder meeting, where director elections take place.94 The idea is that “a
nomination is a piece of ‘proper’ meeting business, distinct from the vote,
which facilitates the subsequent exercise of collective choice in the form of
voting.”95
The idea that a right to nominate directors is a matter of proper business
has been accepted by at least two courts.96 In Goldstein v. Lincoln National
Convertible Securities Fund, Inc., a federal court applying Maryland’s corporation law pertaining to shareholder nominations found that “the general statutory ‘policy [is] to allow any business at annual meetings regardless of
whether that business is specified in the notice.’”97 Several years later, in
Levitt Corp. v. Office Depot, Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery asserted
that the nomination of a candidate “for election as a director is an ‘affair’ or

88. Durkin v. Nat’l Bank of Olyphant, 772 F.2d 55, 59 (3d Cir. 1985) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
89. Harrah’s Entm’t, 802 A.2d at 310.
90. Id. (quoting Linton v. Everett, No. 15219, 1997 WL 441189, at *9 (Del. Ch.
July 31, 1997) (unpublished opinion)).
91. Id. at 311 (quoting Durkin, 772 F.2d at 59).
92. See Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 131.
93. Id.
94. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 131–32.
97. Id. at 132 (quoting Goldstein v. Lincoln Nat’l Convertible Sec. Fund, Inc.,
140 F. Supp. 2d 424, 439 (E.D. Pa. 2001), vacated as moot, No. 01-2259, 2003 WL
1846095 (3d Cir. 2003)).
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‘matter’ . . . [of] ‘business’ – to be considered at the stockholders’ meeting.”98
This perception of the right to nominate may afford greater protection than
the previously ascribed source because it is grounded in a statutory policy
less susceptible to board restriction.99

C. Limiting Shareholders’ Right to Nominate
As is the case with most rights in the corporate setting, the right to nominate directors is alienable.100 It is widely accepted that corporations can
adopt bylaws or articles directly limiting the ability of shareholders to nominate.101 However, an important question remains largely unanswered: to
what degree can shareholders’ right to nominate be restricted? Put differently, to what extent can a corporation’s board of directors control shareholder
nominations?
Due to the “obvious importance of the nomination right in our system of
corporate governance, . . . courts have been reluctant to approve measures
that impede the ability of stockholders to nominate candidates.”102 It has
been repeatedly asserted that “corporate management subjects shareholders to
irreparable harm by denying them the right to vote their shares or unnecessarily frustrating them in their attempt to obtain representation on the board
of directors.”103 Nomination restrictions,104 specifically, “must not infringe
upon the exercise of those rights in an unreasonable way.”105
An inquiry into whether a bylaw unduly restricts shareholders’ opportunity to nominate candidates will likely turn on two factors: proportionality
and neutrality.106 Proportionality revolves around a balancing of the “negative impact of the limitation on the right to nominate against the positive impact on the interests of the corporation and its stockholders.”107 Neutrality
focuses on the similarities between requirements of board nominations for

98. Levitt Corp. v. Office Depot, Inc., C.A. No. 3622-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 47, at *18–19 n.33 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2008).
99. See Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 132.
100. See id. at 133–34.
101. Id. at 136.
102. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 310 (Del. Ch.
2002).
103. Int’l Banknote Co. v. Muller, 713 F. Supp. 612, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
104. It is important here to understand that there exists a distinction between nomination restrictions contained in a bylaw amendment approved by shareholders and an
amendment enacted solely by directors. See Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enters., Inc., No. CIV. A. 11779, 1991 WL 3151, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1991) (unpublished opinion). The latter is the focus here and should be of greater concern due
to the lack of shareholders’ consent to limit their nomination authority.
105. Id.
106. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 139.
107. Id.
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director and those of shareholders.108 Professor Lawrence Hamermesh,109 a
renowned business and corporate law scholar, suggests that a court would
view a provision making the process more cumbersome for shareholders but
not directors with much greater skepticism.110 Where this is the case, a board
necessarily “should be prepared to articulate a legitimate basis for it, grounded in proper corporate interests – and should be comfortable that the differentiation does not overstep the bounds of public policy.”111
Additionally, bylaws should be interpreted and applied so they “do[] not
operate inequitably in the circumstances.”112 In other words, their intent
should dictate their actual effect. Absent proof that both requirements are
satisfied, non-enforcement will result.113 To maintain fairness, a “corporate
election process, if it is to have any validity, must be conducted with scrupulous fairness and without any advantage being conferred or denied to any
candidate or slate of candidates.”114 “Action designed principally to interfere
with the effectiveness of a vote inevitably involves a conflict between the
board and a shareholder majority.”115 Review of this type of issue “involves
a determination of the legal and equitable obligations of an agent towards his
principal.”116 Delaware courts have held that such a determination by the
agent must be done “honestly and competently.”117
In sum, the permissibility of limitations on the shareholder nomination
process remains an unsettled area of the law. The sparse material available
on the subject suggests the source of the right to nominate and the nature of
the restriction being employed must both be considered in any analysis.
Where a company includes the right to nominate in its bylaws, the issue be108. Id. at 140.
109. Professor Hamermesh is a professor emeritus and former Ruby R. Vale Pro-

fessor of Corporate and Business Law at Delaware School of Law. Professor
Hamermesh teaches several topics including corporate finance, mergers and acquisitions, securities regulation, business organizations, and corporate takeovers. Lawrence
Hamermesh,
WIDENER
U.
DEL.
L.
SCH.,
http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/current-students/faculty-directory/faculty/112
(last
visited Feb. 3, 2018). Additionally, he has been a member of the American Law
Institute since 1999 and served as senior special counsel in the Office of Chief Counsel of the Division of Corporation Finance at the Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington, D.C. in 2010 and 2011. Id.
110. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 140.
111. Peter A. Atkins, Richard J. Grossman, & Edward P. Welch, Rethinking Director Nomination Requirements and Conduct in an Era of Shareholder Activism,
SKADDEN (July 1, 2013), https://www.skadden.com/insights/rethinking-directornomination-requirements-and-conduct-era-shareholder-activism.
112. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 149–50.
113. Id.
114. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988) (quoting Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206–07 (Del. Ch. 1987)).
115. Id. at 660.
116. Id.
117. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss4/8

14

Butler: Shareholder Nomination Restrictions

2017]

SHAREHOLDER NOMINATION RESTRICTIONS

1155

comes much narrower. A company being challenged over the validity of a
restriction on the nomination process must be prepared to demonstrate the
intent of the provision and how it operates to achieve that effect in practice.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
Judge Joel P. Fahnestock set forth the judgment of the court, which
readily concluded that Epiq’s rejection of the Villere Nomination was wrongful.118 However, the court declined to reach the shareholder nomination restriction issue because it determined that the extreme eligibility requirements
had been satisfied.119

A. Termination of the Agreement
Judge Fahnestock’s judgment began with an analysis of whether the
four corners of the Agreement were ambiguous.120 The court concluded the
terms in the Agreement were unambiguous, reasoning that the language provided was not susceptible to multiple meanings nor did it create any uncertainty as to its meaning.121 Because no ambiguity existed in the terms of the
document, the court assessed the Agreement using the plain language of its
text.122 Consequently, the court found that Villere’s termination of the
Agreement was valid.123

B. Validity of the Villere Nomination
After finding that Villere properly terminated the Agreement, the court
shifted its focus to the Epiq nomination process and Villere’s purported compliance.124 In particular, the court assessed the meaning of a shareholder entitled to vote – by virtue of owning at least five percent of Epiq’s outstanding
stock – under Epiq’s Bylaws.125 The court, again using the general principles
of contract law, determined the language to be unambiguous and rejected
Epiq’s contention that the term was intended to apply only to a single shareholder.126
Upon examining the entirety of Epiq’s Bylaws and articles of incorporation, the court stated that the term “shareholder” was not designated as a sin-

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Judgment, supra note 33, at 8.
See id. at 8 & n.7.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
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gle owner.127 In fact, the court elaborated that the company’s articles require
that the company treat any registered holder of shares as its owner.128 Moreover, the court stated that the Bylaws mandate whomever is the shareholder
of record on its ledger is deemed to be the owner entitled to all rights regarding the corporation.129 Therefore, the court deemed Cede & Co. both an
owner and shareholder capable of and entitled to nominating a slate of directors at Villere’s direction.130 The court left unclear the likelihood of the
shareholders’ success on their claims as to the validity of the Notification
Bylaw.

V. COMMENT
While the court in Villere did not reach a conclusion on the validity of
Epiq’s Notification Bylaw, its inaction provides an opportunity to explore the
realm of shareholder nominations, as statutes are practically silent and court
precedent outlining the ability to restrict that right is effectively nonexistent.
Guided by the interpretation of the corporate documents and the determination of Villere’s compliance with the Bylaws, the court avoided addressing
the conduct of the Board as it attempted to entrench itself. Although the
court’s holding and the subsequent settlement provide relief to Villere, they
deprive shareholders generally of a concrete determination as to the limits on
a board of directors’ ability to restrict their right to nominate. Epiq’s Notification Bylaw contains multiple restrictions. In addition to an advance notice,
Section 2.3 contains eligibility and disclosure requirements.

A. Establishing a Framework
Under Missouri corporate law, incumbent directors that have not been
re-elected are entitled to maintain their position on the board until their replacement has been elected and qualified.131 Missouri also mandates that a
director be approved by majority vote to be elevated to the board.132 Without
the ability to nominate a replacement director, it is conceivable that an incumbent director could indefinitely remain on a corporation’s board, despite
its shareholders’ wishes.133 For example, an incumbent director who fails to
garner majority support could nevertheless remain on the board so long as the
incumbent board nominates the same number of candidates as there are vacant positions.134 Should a board renominate its incumbent directors each
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
MO. REV. STAT. § 351.315(1) (2016).
MO. REV. STAT. § 351.265 (2016).
Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at 15.
Id. at 14.
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year while denying shareholders the authority to nominate replacements,
these directors would remain on the board indefinitely with or without shareholder approval.135
Epiq’s Notification Bylaw, in conjunction with Missouri corporate law,
unnecessarily frustrates the attempts of its shareholders to procure representation on the Board. Moreover, it undermines the policy justifications of a majority voting standard: that “directors should enjoy the support of shareholders owning the bulk of the company’s stock.”136 Such a practice is in serious
conflict with corporate governance principles. It is also precisely the type of
situation shareholders’ right to nominate is intended to counteract.
First, it is necessary to determine which source of shareholder nomination rights makes the most sense based on the protections afforded to both
shareholders and the corporation. While it may seem well-settled that the
right to vote includes the right to nominate, Professor Hamermesh points out
several holes in this theory. Many corporate statutes allow a company to alter
the default rules. For voting, this means that the typical one vote per share
can be altered or limited in a way that requires a threshold number of shares
to be entitled to vote.137 Professor Hamermesh posits that this linkage could
allow corporations to stipulate in their articles or bylaws that a share does not
entitle the holder to nominate director candidates since it is permissible to
limit the right to vote.138 It is entirely possible for a company’s articles or
bylaws to “create different classes or series of shares, and any class or series
of shares may be granted multiple or fractional votes per share.”139 The right
to vote then may be circumscribed completely for at least some classes of
shares. Nothing in such scenarios indicates that the right to nominate would
also not be eliminated completely. This cuts against the notion that the right
to nominate should be tied to the right to vote because that right could be
eliminated completely in certain contexts. Construing the right to nominate
this way fails to safeguard shareholders’ ability to protect their own investments and to influence firm control through turnover.
Further, “the right to vote can exist and be fully exercised without any
subsumed right to nominate.”140 For example, elections held solely by ballot
or roll call (while hypothetical, are possible) would allow shareholders to
135. Petition, supra note 5, at 14–15. In fact, this exact situation occurred at Epiq
in 2014. Id. at 17. By Epiq’s own admission, Mr. Connolly did not receive a majority vote and was not re-elected. Id. In spite of this, Mr. Connolly remained on the
board as a “holdover director.” Id.
136. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at 15.
137. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 129.
138. Id.
139. ABA PUBLISHING, HANDBOOK FOR THE CONDUCT OF SHAREHOLDERS’
MEETINGS 72 (2d ed. 2010).
140. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 130; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b)
(West 2017) (providing “[s]tockholders may, unless the certificate of incorporation
otherwise provides, act by written consent to elect directors”).
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exercise their right to vote without ever having employed their coinciding
right to nominate.141 In light of these concerns, Professor Hamermesh concludes that the right to nominate is best “viewed not as a form or element of
the right to vote, but as a means to make voting rights more useful by limiting
the informational and transaction costs of evaluating candidates.”142
Given that the nomination process is essential to corporate democracy,
the right of shareholders to nominate candidates for director should be
grounded in a much stronger source. At the very least, it should be afforded
as a proper matter of business to be conducted at a meeting of the shareholders. This approach still provides a company the ability to place restrictions
on that right, such as an advance notice requirement, but precludes the right
to remove it entirely. Nevertheless, Professor Hamermesh’s suggested approach is not without issue. As indicated by Vice Chancellor John W. Noble
in Levitt, a colorable argument can be made that “business,” as it pertains to
an annual meeting, refers only to those actions taken by the shareholders as a
group.143 Thus, voting would be a matter of business because it involves an
action of the entire group, but a nomination would fall short of “business”
since it “is not an official action of the stockholders as a whole.”144 A semantic problem remains in concluding that the right to vote is part of business to
be conducted at an annual meeting.145 It suggests that in the instance of a
corporation without an advance notice bylaw, shareholders could simply
make nominations at the annual meeting itself.146 Surely this would fall short
of providing the information necessary to inform shareholders in a corporate
democracy.
A more tenable option would be to conclude that the right to nominate is
an inherent part of ownership. Placing the right to nominate within the penumbra of ownership comports with corporate governance principles. It will
further the attempt to constrain agency costs, which necessarily include the
director nomination process. The ability to elect and remove directors is considered “essential” for “investor protection.”147 It only makes sense to afford
the right to nominate as fundamental to ownership because it, too, is necessary for investor protection. Shareholders’ right to vote is part of the inherent
right to “control the firm.”148 Including the right to nominate within ownership furthers the protection of this vital right of control in an essential way.
This approach also avoids the pitfalls of tying the right to nominate to the
right to vote (i.e., that it can be eradicated in certain scenarios). Additionally,
141. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 130.
142. Id.
143. Levitt Corp. v. Office Depot, Inc., C.A. No. 3622-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch.

LEXIS 47, at *18–19 n.33 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2008).
144. Id.
145. See id. at *16–18.
146. See id. at *12.
147. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at 13 (emphasis added).
148. Id. (emphasis added).
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it sidesteps the semantic and group action problems of finding it is a matter of
business to be conducted at annual meetings. Yet it succeeds in making voting rights more useful and protecting the shareholder franchise.

B. Considering Potential Shareholder Nomination Restrictions
Considering the importance of the right to nominate candidates for director, it is significant that shareholders know how much their voice can be
muted in legitimate corporate turnover. Using the principles of proportionality, neutrality, and inequitable application, this Note now addresses various
possible restrictions on the right to nominate and offers a determination of
their potential validity.

1. Advance Notice
One widely-employed restriction is advance notice.
Professor
Hamermesh indicates that notice bylaws are “commonplace” and “frequently
upheld as valid.”149 As illustrated by Epiq’s Notification Bylaw, this type of
restriction “typically require[s] shareholders to submit advance notice of their
intent to introduce proposals at shareholder meetings . . . . [and] disclose their
beneficial ownership positions as a condition for nominating directors or
bringing forth other matters at a shareholder meeting.”150 The Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has defined beneficial owners as anyone
owning shares with “(1) Voting power which includes the power to vote, or
to direct the voting of, such security; and/or, (2) Investment power which
includes the power to dispose, or to direct the disposition of, such security.”151
Based on these principles, “it may be inferred that an advance notice bylaw will be validated where it operates as a reasonable limitation upon the
shareholders’ right to nominate candidates for director.”152 In order for advance notice limitations to be reasonable, they must “afford the shareholders
a fair opportunity to nominate candidates.”153 This means the notice period
satisfies the principles of proportionality and neutrality and will not be ap-

149. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 136–37 (quoting Goggin v. Vermillion, Inc.,
No. 6465–V CN, 2011 WL 2347704, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 3, 2011) (unpublished opinion)).
150. Elina Khasina, Note, Disclosure of “Beneficial Ownership” of Synthetic
Positions in Takeover Campaigns, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 904, 921 (2009).
151. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d–3(a)(1)–(2) (2017).
152. Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enters., Inc., No. CIV. A. 11779, 1991
WL 3151, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1991) (unpublished opinion).
153. Id.
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plied inequitably.154 “[W]hen advance notice bylaws unduly restrict the
stockholder franchise or are applied inequitably, they will be struck down.”155
Epiq’s notice period of at least 180 days prior to its next annual meeting
of shareholders is particularly burdensome because it “reduc[es] the shareholder’s flexibility, and [makes] the marginal benefit of facilitating dissemination of additional useful information . . . considerably more attenuated.”156
Here, such an extended period advances no legitimate corporate interest.157
Professor Thom Lambert, an expert familiar with the nomination process,
concluded, “It could not possibly take more than half a year for board members to evaluate the nominees and communicate any concerns to shareholders.”158 Further, the notice period is not neutral because shareholders are
required to submit (and vet) their nominees months prior to when the board
members are required to submit their nominees. Thus, Epiq’s bylaw creates
an unfair advantage for board nominees and is applied inequitably.159
Epiq’s notice period places an undue burden on its shareholders’ right to
nominate. Judging the exact cutoff point at which a notice period exceeds its
usefulness is quite difficult; however, it is not impossible. SEC Rule 14a-8
allows a notice period of up to 120 days for proxy materials, suggesting that
periods more than 120 days, a time intended to be the maximum necessary to
ensure both shareholders and directors are reasonably informed of nominees,
are unreasonable.160

2. Disclosure
Epiq’s Notification Bylaw also includes a considerable disclosure requirement for shareholders and their nominees.161 As a point of reference,
“not a single one of the 10 largest Missouri-based public companies . . . .
requires the intrusive disclosures demanded by the Director Defendants” in
the instant case.162
To date, information disclosure requirements have garnered no judicial
attention.163 However, courts “should and would likely inquire whether the
[requirement] seeks to elicit information comparable to what is available with
respect to board-selected nominees, and whether the information is at least
plausibly useful to shareholders in evaluating competing candidates for office
154. See id.
155. JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 344 (Del.

Ch. 2008) (quoting Openwave Sys. Inc. v. Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I,
Ltd. 924 A.2d 228, 239 (Del. Ch. 2007)).
156. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 140.
157. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation Lambert, supra note 54, at 16.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 17.
160. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(e)(2) (2017).
161. See infra Appendix A.
162. Petition, supra note 5, at 13–15.
163. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 143.
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and not unreasonably burdensome . . . to provide.”164 A good rule of thumb
for boards is to view restrictions in light of the following question: “Would
we, the incumbent board, be prepared to apply the requirement or rule to ourselves and to new nominees proposed in the future by us?”165
Nowhere do Epiq’s Bylaws indicate that board-selected nominees are
required to submit the same information. SEC proxy rules require a board
provide shareholders with each of its nominees’ name; age; a description of
“any arrangement or understanding between him and any other person(s)
(naming such person(s)) pursuant to which he was or is to be selected”; a
five-year employment history; and a brief discussion of “the specific experience, qualifications, attributes or skills that [support why] the person should
serve as a director for the registrant at the time that the disclosure is made, in
light of the registrant’s business and structure.”166 Such information is clearly not as extensive as the approximately three-page list of disclosures shareholders must make under Epiq’s Notification Bylaw.
This inequitable treatment is not grounded in any legitimate corporate
interest. It plainly makes the process of nominating more onerous for shareholders while maintaining the relatively minimal disclosure requirements for
board-selected candidates. With such exhaustive requirements making it
practically unmanageable to produce a shareholder-selected nominee, the
benefit of information is moot. Thus, the disclosure requirements in Epiq’s
Bylaws operate inequitably and fail to achieve their purpose. Similarly constructed bylaws would likely result in non-enforcement.
On the other hand, it is possible that a board could take steps to ensure
its company’s extensive disclosure requirements are able to overcome a challenge. To avoid the initial problem of severely limiting shareholders’ ability
to produce a nominee, the disclosure process could be broken into a two-step
progression. At the notification stage, only the “identification of the proposed nominees and their shareholder-sponsor, and the concurrent submission
of completed preliminary questionnaires by those parties, made available to
them through the company’s secretary” would be required.167 This would be
a much less arduous task to achieve within the time frame of an advance notice period.168 By reserving the right to require additional disclosures, the
company could use the already obtained information to formulate what additional information it will request and a justification for requiring it.169 It
would be much harder to successfully assert a challenge against disclosures
narrowly tailored to individual or groups of shareholder nominees, so long as
they are rationally related to a corporate interest.170
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 146.
Atkins, Grossman & Welch, supra note 111.
17 C.F.R. § 229.401(a), (e)(1) (2017).
Atkins, Grossman & Welch, supra note 111 (emphasis added).
See id.
See id.
See id.
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3. Ownership
A requirement that shareholder nominations be buoyed by a minimum
percentage of share ownership is “undoubtedly rare in the context of publicly
traded corporations.”171 The “[s]everity of impact on the ability to nominate
[will] depend on the individual corporation’s circumstances, most notably the
configuration of the holdings of its shares, and the likely ability to assemble
nomination requests from holders of the specified ownership.”172 Combination with other requirements “[presents] additional questions of validity.”173
Epiq’s Notification Bylaw maintains that a nominating shareholder must
own at least five percent of the outstanding shares for a period greater than
twenty-four months.174 Its stated rationale for enacting this requirement is “to
make sure that only large, committed, knowledgeable shareholders [can]
nominate individuals to be elected as director.”175 Epiq’s securities filings
indicate very few shareholders own enough shares to qualify as a nominating
shareholder.176 More concerning is that “since 2009, there have been no more
than three to five 5% shareholders in any given year who also were listed as a
5% shareholder for the prior year (i.e., a 5% shareholder for 24 months).”177
Perhaps this rare ability to meet a five percent ownership requirement is why
such a threshold is “inconsistent with best practices.”178
Because shareholders invest their own money in the acquisition of
shares and thereby create a financial stake in the company’s success, “shareholders with far smaller holdings than 5% and/or who have held shares for far
less than two-years are [often] highly knowledgeable and committed to the
companies in which they hold shares.”179 While this may not be true of all
shareholders, some qualified shareholders are precluded from the nomination
process.180 Standard practice in the proxy access context is an ownership
requirement of no more than three percent, which should serve as a ceiling.181
This suggests that a five percent ownership requirement is “overly onerous in
the proxy access situation . . . [so] it is certainly an unreasonable barrier to
making a simple nomination.”182 Certainly, the threshold for nominating
must be lower than that for proxy access.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 151.
Id. at 153.
Id.
Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Professor Charles M. Elson at 6, St. Denis J.
Villere & Co. v. Epiq Systems, Inc., (Mo. Cir. Ct. Jackson Cty. Mar. 7, 2016) (No.
1516-CV26509) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Elson].
175. Id.
176. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation Lambert, supra note 54, at 15.
177. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Elson, supra note 175, at 4.
178. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at 16.
179. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Elson, supra note 175, at 6.
180. Id.
181. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c)(2)(i) (2017).
182. Plaintiff’s Expert Designation: Lambert, supra note 54, at 16.
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Epiq’s five percent ownership requirement operates inequitably by
providing board-selected nominees an obvious advantage: very few, if any,
shareholders will possess the requisite number of shares to produce an opponent. Since no ownership threshold is imposed on the Board, its ownership
restriction is not neutral. The negative impact of the limitation on the right of
shareholders to nominate greatly outweighs the positive impact of granting
only potentially committed, knowledgeable nominations to the corporation.
Suggesting that the economic interest in stock results in a superior class of
nominees is of “questionable validity.”183
A five percent ownership threshold unduly restricts the right of shareholders to nominate candidates for director. Because it is possible for directors to eliminate the ability of certain shareholders to vote, allowing such
large ownership requirements as a prerequisite for the ability to nominate
may have the effect of eliminating shareholders’ ability to control their investment. That is not to say that an ownership requirement is altogether unduly burdensome. Rather, it is only so in contexts where the threshold number of shares is proven to be exceptionally uncommon or unlikely. A caseby-case approach should be undertaken when evaluating this specific type of
nomination restriction.

4. Rejection of Candidates for Failure to Satisfy Qualifications
It is generally accepted that qualification requirements to serve as a director will be set forth in a corporation’s bylaws or articles of incorporation.184 The question is then “whether . . . a director qualification could also
be framed as a condition to the right to nominate, such that no nominee who
fails to satisfy the qualification requirement may be nominated for election to
the board.”185 For example, in Triplex Shoe Co. v. Rice & Hutchins, Inc.,186 a
court “concluded that stockholders were free to nominate and elect a candidate who did not at that point satisfy a share ownership qualification . . . rec-

183. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 153–54. Professor Hamermesh suggests that
if an ownership requirement were instead based on the justification that nominating
should rest on the level of voting power, it would be more likely to withstand scrutiny. See id. This is based on the theory of non-profit corporations that nominations by
shareholders with “trivial . . . voting power indicates that the nomination would most
likely be futile and therefore unnecessarily disruptive.” Id. at 154. This Note disagrees with this alternative justification for two reasons: (1) publicly traded corporations are a world apart from non-profit corporations, and (2) such a justification
strikes down the notion that shareholders have an inherent right to protect their investment through the corporate electoral process.
184. See MO. REV. STAT. § 351.310 (2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.02
(2010).
185. Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 156.
186. Triplex Shoe Co. v. Rice & Hutchins, Inc., 152 A. 342, 351 (Del. 1930).
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ognizing . . . the candidate could, before being seated, acquire the necessary
shares.”187
Such issues would certainly turn on a court’s interpretation of the company’s bylaws, most likely using the rules of contract. As such, it is important that a bylaw listing requirement be drafted precisely. It should define
whether “a candidate who fails to meet a qualification requirement may not
be nominated at the meeting unless the candidate has . . . come into compliance with the requirement if and when elected and seated as a director.”188

5. Complete Elimination of the Right to Nominate
Ultimately, may a corporation eliminate entirely shareholders’ right to
nominate candidates for director? The answer to this question will likely
hinge in large part on the source of that right. If the right to nominate derives
from conducting proper business, “even a charter provision cannot entirely
take that right away from a stockholder entitled to attend and vote on the election of directors.”189 On the other hand, if the right to nominate originates in
the statutory right to vote, it likewise may not be eliminated in its entirety.190
Moreover, as this Note maintains, the right to nominate may not be eliminated entirely because it is a core element of share ownership and to do so would
strip owners of any control over their own investment.

C. Standard of Review
A board-enacted nomination restriction presents an inherent conflict of
interest. Such conflicts blatantly contradict directors’ duty of loyalty by making it considerably easier for directors to successfully entrench themselves.
Should courts afford the protection of the business judgment rule191 or simply

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Hamermesh, supra note 75, at 156 (citing Triplex Shoe, 152 A. at 351).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 150–51.
See id.
The business judgment rule is a jurisdictional doctrine applicable to transactions of directors challenged by shareholders. “[C]ourts will not interfere with or
attempt to control the internal management or policy of a corporation except in cases
of fraud, bad faith, breach of trust, gross mismanagement, or ultra vires acts on the
part of the officers or directors.” Leggett v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 342 S.W.2d 833,
851 (Mo. 1960) (en banc) (emphasis added). Such actions “may constitute ground for
judicial interference, even though the act involves an exercise of the officer’s discretion.” Id.; see also Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779–80 (Ill. Ct. App.
1968); Kamin v. American Express, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (NY Sup. Ct. 1976);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 (2010).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss4/8

24

Butler: Shareholder Nomination Restrictions

2017]

SHAREHOLDER NOMINATION RESTRICTIONS

1165

use the proportional and neutral test outlined above,192 this possibility becomes much more likely.
It would be permissible for restrictions approved by a majority of shareholders – however uncommon – to continue to be evaluated using proportionality and neutrality, but restrictions imposed solely by a board need to be
analyzed under a stricter standard. In fact, Delaware courts have previously
indicated that these issues are “not [to] be left to the agent’s business judgment” alone.193 Courts should instead apply the conditional business judgment rule to board-enacted nomination restrictions. This measure appears
rational because restricting the ability to nominate can, generally, be equated
to a board’s attempt to avert being replaced (i.e., taken over). Furthermore,
heightened “scrutiny is mandated by: . . . the threatened diminution of the
current stockholders’ voting power . . . and . . . the traditional concern of . . .
courts for actions which impair or impede stockholder voting rights.”194
Use of a conditional business judgment rule would mean: “(a) a judicial
determination regarding the adequacy of the decisionmaking process employed by the directors, including the information on which the directors
based their decision; and (b) a judicial examination of the reasonableness of
the directors’ action in light of the circumstances then existing.”195 Directors
are responsible for the burden of persuasion – namely, demonstrating that
they were “adequately informed and acted reasonably.”196 The burden can be
met with a showing that the decision was made in “good faith” after a “reasonable investigation.”197 A board will then be required to show that the imposition of the nomination restriction was reasonable in relation to the purpose for which it was enacted.198 Nonetheless, “courts will not substitute
their business judgment for that of the directors, but will determine if the
directors’ decision was, on balance, within a range of reasonableness.”199

VI. CONCLUSION
Although the court was deprived of an opportunity to decide the validity
of Epiq’s Notification Bylaw, the unresolved issue provides an opportunity to
fill a hole in corporate law that will inevitably be of importance in an emerging era of shareholder activism. A framework to determine the validity of
192. The proportional and neutral test appears to be a simplified construction of
that rule since directors need only show the restriction is somehow in the best interests of the corporation.
193. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660 (Del. Ch. 1988).
194. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del.
1994).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
198. “If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment
rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.” Id.
199. Paramount Commc’ns, 637 A.2d at 45.
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and extent to which shareholders’ right to nominate can be restricted has remained largely non-existent to this point. It appears that a large reason for
that absence is due to a lack of consensus as to where the right to nominate
originates. Rather than continuing in uncertainty, courts should recognize
that the right to nominate is an inherent right of share ownership. That right
should be limited only when doing so promotes a legitimate corporate purpose. Fundamental rights have always been afforded a stricter standard of
scrutiny when a restriction placed on them is challenged by those subject to
the restriction. Corporate rights need not be viewed any differently. Shareholder challenges to nomination restrictions enacted by a board alone should
be reviewed under a conditional business judgment rule. As shareholder activism increases and boards of directors seek to mitigate the rising risk of
dysfunction caused by attempts to influence the company,200 it is essential
that courts know how to approach these matters.

Table I: Total Shareholder Returns

Year 1

Year 3

Year 5

Year 10

Epiq Systems

(9.79%)

6.71%

3.55%

1.87%

Russell 3000

2.57%

16.00%

14.11%

7.57%

12.36%

9.29%

9.29%

5.7%

Versus Russell 3000201

Outperformance /
Underperformance

200. Atkins, Grossman & Welch, supra note 111.
201. Versus Russell 3000 is a stock market index, which acts as a point of refer-

ence for gauging how the overall market is performing. Russell US Indexes, FTSE
RUSSELL, http://www.ftse.com/products/indices/russell-us (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
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APPENDIX A
Amended and Restated Bylaws of Epiq Systems, Inc. art. II, § 2.3
(c) The shareholder’s notice required pursuant to Section 2.3(b) (the
“Shareholder’s Notice”) shall, in the event it includes a nomination of persons for election to the Board of Directors, set forth the following information:
(i) the name, address and contact information of the shareholder
who owns 5% of the Corporation’s outstanding common stock and
has held such shares for at least twenty-four months and who intends to make the nomination of persons for election to the Board
of Directors (the “Nominating Shareholder”) and any Shareholder
Associated Person (such Shareholder Associated Person(s) and the
shareholder who intends to make the nomination, the ‘‘Nominating
Persons”);
(ii) in addition, the Nominating Persons shall provide the following
information:
(A) the class and number of shares of stock of the Corporation
which are owned and held by the Nominating Shareholder;
(B) a detailed listing of all acquisitions or dispositions of stock
of the Corporation by the Nominating Shareholder (including
the number of shares acquired or disposed of in such transaction) during the twenty-four months preceding the date of the
Shareholder’s Notice;
(C) the class and number of shares of stock of the Corporation
which are directly or indirectly held of record or beneficially
owned (as such term is defined in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3
(“Ru1e 13d-3”» by each of the Nominating Persons, the date
such shares were acquired and the investment intent of such
acquisition;
(D) with respect to the Corporation’s securities, a detailed description of any Derivative Positions directly or indirectly held
or beneficially held by each Nominating Person and the date
on which such Derivative Positions were acquired;
(E) whether and the extent to which a Hedging Transaction has
been entered into by or on behalf of each Nominating Person
and a detailed description of such Hedging Transaction, in-

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

27

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 8

1168

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

cluding the date on which any such Hedging Transactions was
entered into or materially modified;
(F) detailed disclosures (including date, substantive description
of all matters discussed and participants) with respect to each
direct or indirect (through any agent, representative or other
person) communication, arrangement or agreement, in each
case, whether written or oral (any such communication, arrangement or agreement, a “13d Communication”) during the
twelve months preceding the date of the Shareholder’s Notice,
between any Nominating Persons or any Proposed Nominees
(as defined below), on the one hand, and any person or entity
that was at the time of such 13d Communication, or has since
become, required to file pursuant to 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l of
the Exchange Act, on the other hand, in respect of their interests in the Corporation and, in the case of any written 13d
Communication, copies thereof;
(G) detailed disclosures about any person who contacted or
was contacted by the Nominating Persons regarding the Proposed Nominees during the twelve months prior to the date of
the Shareholder’s Notice, including in such disclosure the
name and address of the contacted or contacting person and the
date of contact;
(H) information detailing the investment intent or objective of
each of the Nominating Persons, including in each case information verifying the date on which such investment intent was
formed or changed;
(I) a representation that the Nominating Person or Nominating
Persons are entitled to vote in the election of directors at the
meeting and intends to appear in person or by proxy at the
meeting to nominate the Proposed Nominees;
(J) a representation as to whether any Nominating Persons will
solicit, directly or indirectly, a proxy from the holders of a sufficient number of the Corporation’s outstanding shares required in order to elect each Proposed Nominee or otherwise to
solicit proxies from shareholders in support of the nomination
(such representation, a “Nomination Solicitation Statement”);
and
(K) any other information required to be included in a proxy
statement or other filings required to be made in connection
with the solicitation of proxies or consents for a contested elec-
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tion of directors (even if an election contest or proxy solicitation is not involved) pursuant to Section 14 of the Exchange
Act, and the rules, regulations and schedules promulgated
thereunder;
(iii) in addition, the Nominating Persons shall provide the following in respect of the person or persons to be nominated for election
to the Board of Directors by the Nominating Persons (the “Proposed Nominees”):
(A) the name, address and contact information of the Proposed
Nominees;
(B) a statement of the Proposed Nominee’s qualifications;
(C) a description of any and all historical, current or planned
compensatory, payment or other financial agreement, arrangement or understanding (oral or written) between the Proposed Nominees, on the one hand, and any other person or entity (including the Nominating Persons) other than the Corporation, on the other hand, in each case in connection with candidacy or service as a director of the Corporation;
(D) the class and number of shares of stock of the Corporation
which are directly or indirectly held of record or beneficially
owned (as such term is defined in Rule 13d-3) by each of the
Proposed Nominees, the date such shares were acquired and
the investment intent of such acquisition;
(E) with respect to the Corporation’s securities, a detailed description of any Derivative Positions directly or indirectly held
or beneficially held by each Proposed Nominee and the date on
which such Derivative Positions were acquired;
(F) whether and the extent to which a Hedging Transaction has
been entered into by or on behalf of each Proposed Nominee
and a detailed description of such Hedging Transaction, including the date on which any such Hedging Transaction was
entered into or materially modified;
(G) the written consent signed by each Proposed Nominee evidencing a willingness to serve as a director if elected;
(H) a commitment by each Proposed Nominee to meet personally with the Corporation’s nominating and corporate governance committee;

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

29

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 8

1170

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

(I) the completed and executed Nominee Representation and
Agreement described in Section 2.3(j) of this Article II; and
(J) any other information required to be included in a proxy
statement or other filings required to be made in connection
with the solicitation of proxies or consents for a contested election of directors (even if an election contest or proxy solicitation is not involved) pursuant to Section 14 of the Exchange
Act, and the rules, regulations and schedules promulgated
thereunder.

APPENDIX B
Director Appointment Agreement § 2(c)
At any time after the 2015 Annual Meeting, Villere may terminate the
Standstill Period upon ten (10) days’ written notice to the other parties to this
Agreement and, following receipt of such notice, the Board may accept the
resignation of the Villere Designee from the Board; provided, however, if the
Villere Designee (or an alternate candidate designated by Villere and approved by the Board pursuant to Section 1(i)(B)) has been included on the
Company’s slate of directors for an upcoming Annual Meeting, then the
Standstill Period shall not be terminable until the day following such Annual
Meeting.202

202. See Petition, supra note 5, at 18.
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